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I. Introduction
It is an odd fact that the economic basis for major elements of public policy and
expenditure depends importantly on the size of one of the least well measured of all
economic phenomena: human capital externalities. The case for intervention has long
been thought to rest in large part on the importance of education externalities.1 In the last
15 years the enthusiasm for measures to encourage investment in human capital has been
bolstered by the rise of endogenous growth theory and empirical evidence that shows
education plays an important role in economic growth (see e.g. Barro, 1991, 1997,
2001a&b). Nevertheless, the empirical basis for the belief in human capital externalities
remains relatively weak.
Human capital externalities may be quite diverse. In addition to the effects on the
use of technology, innovation and growth that have received most attention recently,
there may be static effects on others’ earnings, and non-market effects via e.g. health,
fertility, longevity, crime, civic participation, political stability, level of democracy, takeup of transfer payments, and higher taxes paid by the more educated. Some of the latter
effects are internal (if I practice better hygiene because I’m more educated my health, as
well as that of others, may benefit), but others are external. Non-market externalities
may feed back on earnings, growth etc., as emphasized in the work of McMahon (1999,
2001).
This paper attempts an overview of all kinds of human capital externalities. There
is a very large literature on the topic, and it will not be possible to review every
contribution carefully (to say the least!). The strategy adopted will be to summarize
briefly what has been learned in the literature and look more closely at selected studies.
Many studies have estimated the private rate of return to investment in human
capital, particularly via postsecondary education. In the absence of externalities, and
assuming that schooling is a productive investment rather than pure signaling or
screening, these private rates of return would coincide with the social rate of return.2
However, if human capital has positive externalities then the social rate of return will be
larger than the private rate of return. One of the key things to try to extract from the
literature is therefore evidence on the social rate of return to human capital. As we shall
see, some studies suggest that there is a significant wedge between private and social
rates of return, while others dispute this.
The literature on human capital externalities is fragmented and somewhat
contentious. The evidence that human capital externalities are quantitatively important
has come increasingly under attack, e.g. by Heckman and Klenow (1997) and Acemoglu
and Angrist (2000). This fact would hardly be evident to a reader of what might be
termed the “pro-externalities” literature. (See e.g. OECD, 2001, which does not
1

The other major justification for intervention is that since people cannot pledge their human capital as
collateral for a loan there is a serious imperfection in the private market for student loans.
2
Under signaling or screening, workers’ attributes do not change during schooling. Length of schooling, or
grades obtained, communicate innate skills to prospective employers. While in some models this may be
productive, as a result of better worker-employer matches, in others workers’ productivity on the job is
unaffected. In the latter case schooling is wasteful (since it consumes students’ time and other resources)
and the social rate of return is less than the private rate of return. Most labor economists believe that the
preponderance of evidence is in favor of a productive interpretation of schooling. See e.g. Topel (1999,
p. 2972).
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reference Heckman and Klenow, or Acemoglu and Angrist.) At the same time, the critics
have not yet addressed some important contributions from the other side. This is a
curious debate, but one that needs to be studied carefully.
A further point to note concerns the distinction between pecuniary and
technological externalities. Perhaps surprisingly, this standard distinction is little
mentioned in the empirical literature on human capital externalities. In static welfare
economics, pecuniary externalities are ignored unless one is interested in distribution.
The reason is that for every pecuniary gain there is a pecuniary loss, and vice versa. For
example, if many new lawyers are trained, the fees of existing lawyers will go down, a
pecuniary loss, but this is at the same time a gain to their clients. From the viewpoint of
economic efficiency, "it's a wash". In dynamic analysis, however, pecuniary externalities
can have real effects, as pointed out e.g. by Acemoglu (1996).3 If more computer
programmers are trained, for example, this will encourage investment in the facilities
where programmers work, and also human investments by complementary workers, for
example systems analysts. The result, in the end, is a net addition to national income.
Perhaps because there is so much current interest in dynamics, there is little effort in the
empirical literature to distinguish between pecuniary and technological externalities. The
presumption seems to be that most positive externalities of education and training are
"good for growth" and therefore should not be ignored in welfare analysis.
This paper is organized as follows. The evidence for market externalities is
reviewed first. Section II looks at the relationship between education and growth, where
most of the evidence comes from aggregate data. In Section III we look at macro
evidence on static externalities, and in section IV we review static studies using micro
data. Non-market externalities are considered in Section V.
II. Macro Evidence on Dynamic Externalities
Alternative macro models of human capital externalities can be discussed in the
framework of the following version of the one-sector aggregate production function:
(1)

Y = A Kα Hβ (hε L)γ

Here Y is aggregate output, A is a parameter reflecting the level of technology, K is
physical capital, H is the human capital stock, L is the size of the labor force, and h =
H/L. While in neoclassical growth models A is taken as exogenous, in the endogenous
growth models of the last 15 years it often depends on H or H/L. This may reflect an
effect of human capital on technology adoption (as in the case of an LDC that is
"catching up") or on innovation (as in a technological leader like Europe or the U.S.).
While some such effects may be internal to firms, others may represent externalities.
Including H as a separate element in the production function allows the human capital
stock to have positive external effects in production.

3

Acemoglu considers alternative theoretical models showing how more human capital accumulation can
reduce search costs in labor markets, and thereby encourage complementary investments.
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With particular parameter values (1) simplifies to give polar cases that have been
important in the literature. For example, if ε = 0 we get the case considered by Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992):
(1')
Y = A Kα Hβ Lγ
in which H and L enter as separate factors of production (contrary to the usual view of
human capital in the labor literature). At the other extreme, ε = 1, and we get:
(1'')

Y = A Kα Hβ + γ

in which the labor force enters production in effective units, hL = H, which is in keeping
with the original spirit of human capital theory. Of special significance in either (1') or
(1''), of course, is the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas case, in which α + β + γ = 1.
There is now a large literature that estimates production functions like (1), (1'),
(1'') or models based on such functions. The results may throw some light on how
important human capital is in explaining the level or growth rate of GDP. But what can
they tell us about the importance of human capital externalities? First, if estimated
production functions showed increasing returns to scale that would likely be taken as
evidence of human capital externalities in production. (In that case, an individual firm’s
production function could still exhibit constant returns, as normally expected in a
competitive economy.) Second, human capital externalities may be inferred if A is found
to depend on H. In that case, human capital contributes to total factor productivity
growth (TFP). To the extent that human capital exerts its influence on growth via TFP,
in the language of Romer (1993) it operates through an influence on “ideas” rather than
“objects”.
Neoclassical Approach
Until fairly recently, mainstream economists' knowledge of growth consisted
largely of neoclassical growth theory (Solow-Swan models and the large literature that
elaborated on them) and growth accounting exercises. Neoclassical growth models took
growth of the labor force, labor quality, and technology as exogenous, and usually
constant. The sum of these growth rates gave the steady-state growth rate of GDP. The
latter did not depend on rates of saving and investment, whose impact was felt rather on
the steady-state level of GDP.
Neoclassical growth theory seemed sensible in the light of the results of growth
accounting, pursued most notably by Denison (1961). Denison found that over the period
1909-57 trend growth in output in the U.S. had been fairly steady at about 2.9%.
Employed man-hours had risen at 1.3% and the capital stock at 2.4%. Lucas (1988)
calculates that all but about 1 percentage point of the growth in output could be
accounted for by increases in capital and labor. This residual represented the exogenous
technical progress of neoclassical theory.
Endogenous Growth Theory and the Neoclassical Response
The disappointing growth experience of the 1970’s and 1980’s in the U.S. and
elsewhere suggested that technical progress might in fact not be exogenous, giving
impetus to the development of endogenous growth theory. Human capital plays a very
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important role in this new literature. It may act as an engine of growth as a result either
of externalities in human capital formation, in innovation, or in production. Externalities
in any of these forms may clearly affect the level of national income, and short-run
growth. If the externalities are sufficiently strong they may also affect the long-run
growth rate.
The pioneer in endogenous growth theory was Romer (1986, 1990). The new
theory was, however, perhaps most forcefully urged by Lucas (1988). Lucas argued that
in order to understand international patterns in the level and growth rate of per capita
GDP it was necessary to appeal to human capital externalities. Otherwise it would be
impossible to explain the incredible diversity in GDP per capita across countries - - from
lows of around $250 US in countries like India to an average of about $10,000 in
advanced industrial countries. In Lucas's opinion conventional theory also could not
explain the great diversity of growth rates, or the fact that flows of factors or goods did
not equalize capital-labor ratios and factor returns across countries.
As is often the case, a clear statement of a new explanation for a set of empirical
phenomena soon led to challenges, most notably from Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) - “MRW”. As is well known, MRW tried to show that a neoclassical model could
explain most of the observed differences between countries, without appealing to
differences in the technology used across countries. They concluded that almost 80% of
the per capita income differences could be explained merely by differences in human and
physical capital and the rate of population growth.5
MRW have been criticized on a variety of grounds. Most significantly for our
purposes, concern has been focused on their measure of human capital investment, which
was the fraction of the working age population enrolled in secondary school. Klenow
and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) add primary and tertiary enrolment, and find that this
reduces the fraction of income differences that can be explained using the MRW analysis
from about 80% to 40%. This leaves 60% to be explained by differences between
countries in "efficiency".
Barro (2001b) suggests a synthesis that would acknowledge that both Lucas and
MRW had a point. Barro's empirical work refined the MRW approach, to produce an
extended neoclassical model. But he feels that endogenous growth theory is also
valuable, and sums up the contributions of the two perspectives as follows:
“The recent endogenous growth models are useful for understanding why advanced
economies – and the world as a whole – can continue to grow in the long run
despite the workings of diminishing returns in the accumulation of physical and
human capital. In contrast, the extended neoclassical framework does well as a
vehicle for understanding relative growth rates across countries, for example, for
assessing why South Korea grew much faster than the U.S. or Zaire over the last 30
years. Thus, overall, the new and old theories are more complementary than they
are competing.”
4

While human capital has the lead in much endogenous growth literature, there are models where it plays a
supporting role instead. These include models where R&D investment is the key to innovation or where
growth occurs by "creative destruction". (See e.g. Nelson and Phelps, 1966, and Aghion and Howitt, 1998.)
5
Since data on human and physical capital stocks were not available, MRW used investment rates instead - which can stand in for the stocks under the assumption that countries are in their steady states.
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Barro and various co-authors have been engaged in a steady program of empirical
research on international differences in income levels and growth for about the last dozen
years. The landmark contributions are Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995),
and Barro (1997). The latest results are summarized in Barro (2001a, 2001b), on which
the following discussion is based. The approach attempts to avoid simultaneity problems
by using initial levels, e.g. of GDP per capita or schooling, to explain subsequent
growth.6 The empirical strategy has been strengthened in the most recent contributions
by the use of a panel structure. This allows the use of lagged variables as instruments,
which again helps to deal with simultaneity problems. (See Temple, 1999.)
Barro indicates that the basis for his empirical framework can be summarized in
the equation:
(2)

Dy = F(y, y*)

where Dy is the growth rate of per capita national income, y, and y* is the steady state or
long-run level of y. However, more insight is provided, I think, if we also take explicit
account of the fact that steady-state growth rates, g, can vary between countries. In the
neoclassical model g equals the rate of growth of effective labor units per capita, which in
the original Solow-Swan models was just the rate of technical progress, gt. These days,
growth in human capital per worker, gh, must also be taken into account. Thus g = gt + gh
and we think of both components of this steady-state growth rate as endogenous. Note
further that gt is often now believed to depend on the total or per capita stock of human
capital (or perhaps the ratio of human to physical capital). Taking all this into account,
Barro’s (2) can be extended to:
(2')

Dy = F(y, y*, g)

Since y in an economy below its steady-state will rise toward y*, when y < y* the
growth rate exceeds the steady-state rate. Similarly, where y > y* the growth rate should
be lower than in steady state. This represents conditional convergence. The finding of
conditional convergence in international comparisons, as well as for regions within
countries (e.g. Japan and the U.S.) is a robust finding of Barro’s work. A stylized result
is that on average about 2 % of the difference between y and y* is eroded annually.
Holding y constant, a country with higher y* will grow more rapidly (because it is
further below the steady-state). Higher y* will come with a higher saving rate, better
political institutions, lower fertility, and a less distorted economy.
Barro’s central case results are shown in Table 1 of Barro (2001a) and the first
column of Table 1 in Barro (2001b). They are for a panel of roughly 100 countries.
Three decade-long periods are used: 1965-75, 1975-85 and 1985-95. The dependent
variable is the average growth rate of real per capita GDP in each of the three periods. I
summarize Barro’s apparent interpretation of his results briefly for the non-education
variables and then discuss the education results in more detail:
6

A regression of Y on current values of K, H, and L, that is an attempt to estimate e.g. (1') directly, would
tend to produce biased and inconsistent coefficients since the right-hand side variables are all arguably
endogenous and determined simultaneously with Y.
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log y: hump-shaped effect; most of the observations are past the hump, implying
conditional convergence.
Gov’t. consumption: negative effect, perhaps because higher expenditures imply higher
(distortionary) taxes.
Rule-of-law index: positive effect; y* higher with more secure property rights, less crime
etc.
Openness ratio: positive effect; due to higher y*; confirms studies by e.g. Sachs and
Warner (1995) that more open economies grow faster.
Inflation rate: marginally significant negative effect, interpretation unclear.
log fertility: negative effect; y* lower.
Investment/GDP: marginally significant positive; due to higher y*. (Barro argues that the
use of lagged investment as an instrument provides “some reason to believe” the effect
does not reflect reverse causation.)
Growth Rate of Terms of Trade: positive effect, interpretation unclear.
Education: The education variable is one that Barro has found over the years has the most
explanatory power in this type of equation. It is the average years of secondary and
tertiary schooling attainment for males aged 25 and above at the beginning of the period.
There is a strong and significant positive effect. One way of gauging the strength of the
effect is that a one-year increase in male schooling attainment would lead, after full
adjustment, to a 19% increase in GDP per capita. On the other hand, Barro (2001b, p.
30) calculates that the coefficient implies an average social rate of return to schooling of
just 7%. As discussed in Bils and Klenow (2000), Psacharopoulos (1994) assembled a
collection of micro-based estimates of the private rate of return to schooling in 56
countries that has an average rate of return of 9.9%. At first blush, this comparison
would seem to suggest that the Barro results show no evidence of externalities. In the
presence of externalities the social rate of return should exceed the private rate of return.
However, as we shall see below, it is possible to argue that Barro’s rate of return captures
only dynamic returns to schooling, and that these should be regarded as additional to the
usual micro-based rates of return.
Other results Barro reports include separate regressions for OECD, rich, and poor
countries, results for primary education, and results for females. In the OECD and rich
countries very small effects of education are found. These small effects may possibly be
explained by small variation in schooling attainment across these countries combined
with measurement error. Primary school attainment has an insignificant effect for both
males and females, and female’s schooling has insignificant effects on growth. The latter
result may indicate that many countries are poor at harnessing females' human capital for
technology adoption and other growth-promoting forces. Alternatively, some have
argued that measurement problems are more severe for female schooling.
In addition to looking at the quantity of schooling, in company with a number of
other recent researchers (e.g. Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Bils and Klenow, 2001), Barro
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looks at the impact of schooling quality - - as indicated by test scores. For a sub sample
of about 40 (mostly rich) countries he has data on science, mathematics, and reading test
scores. These turn out to be much more important than schooling attainment in
explaining growth. For example, when science scores alone are added to the regression
shown here in Table 1 it is found that a one-standard deviation increase in those scores
would raise the growth rate on impact by 1.0% - - vs. a 0.2% increase for a one-standarddeviation rise in male schooling attainment.7 These results seem consistent with stories
that emphasize the role of schooling in speeding technology adoption or innovation - - in
part via externalities.
Note that while Barro estimates the social rate of return to increasing human
capital accumulation at the extensive margin - - via a one-year increase in schooling for
all workers - - a parallel calculation is not made for raising investment on the intensive
margin, that is in the quality dimension. The difficulty is that this calculation requires an
estimate of the cost of raising average test scores, or some other measure of quality, by a
given amount. (For test scores, Barro's results indicate the benefit, in terms of increased
GDP.) It would not be impossible to make such calculations. Test scores have been
improving in recent years in most Canadian provinces, for example, apparently due to a
more rigorous curriculum and higher standards for student achievement. Estimating how
much it has cost to make these improvements should be possible. However, I am not
aware of any such estimates having been made to date.
Finally, we should note that Barro's use of initial schooling attainment, a proxy
for the human capital stock, rather than the growth of human capital, as a determinant of
per capita GDP growth is significant. If one thinks in terms of estimating the production
function (1), (1') or (1'') DY is explained by DH, not by H. So, why does Barro use
schooling attainment as his human capital variable? The answer can be conveniently
discussed in the context of the work by Benhabib and Spiegel (1994).
Benhabib and Spiegel
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) start by estimating (1'), in first difference form.
They use cross-country data on a sample of 78 countries, and use a measure of the human
capital stock derived by Kyriacou (1991). Their estimate of β is small positive (.063) and
insignificant. When initial GDP is added as a regressor, to control for neoclassical
convergence, the coefficient on DH becomes insignificantly negative and remains so in
several different specifications. Similar results have apparently been obtained whenever
aggregate production functions are estimated in first difference form, as Pritchett (1999)
and Krueger and Lindahl (2000) argue they should. (See also Bloom et al., 2001.)
While these results are surprising, they should perhaps not be entirely unexpected.
While it is true that schooling levels have a strong positive crude correlation with GDP
per capita growth across countries, the same is not true for changes in schooling. The
advanced countries in the sample, which have relatively high growth rates, already had a
high level of schooling attainment at the beginning of the sample period. There was little
room for them to increase human capital per worker. On the other hand, many of the
7

When included separately in the regression, science and mathematics scores both have a significant
positive effect, but science scores have a larger impact. When included on their own, reading scores are
insignificant negative. When math or science scores are included along with reading scores, the coefficient
for the latter becomes positive.
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slowest growers started the sample period with very low schooling attainment and saw
large increases. While these observations do not explain why measured human capital
growth has no contemporaneous impact on GDP growth, they do provide some
reassurance that the regression results are believable!
Benhabib and Spiegel go on to develop a model of the role of human capital in
technological adoption and innovation. Here they argue that it is the average stock of
human capital in a period, rather than its growth rate, which is the critical factor. Their
results bear this out, showing that the rate at which low-income countries close the
income gap with the technological leader in the sample is increasing in their human
capital stock. For high-income countries, growth is directly increasing in the human
capital stock (i.e. not interacted with the income gap), which Benhabib and Speigel
interpret as a sign of an innovation effect.
The Benhabib and Spiegel results suggest that the reason Barro’s male schooling
attainment variable has a significant positive effect on growth is not that initial schooling
is a proxy for subsequent human capital growth, but that it has an impact on technology
adoption and innovation. In other words, human capital has its (measured) impact on
growth primarily via ideas rather than objects. Barro appears to agree with this
interpretation.8 This is why it was suggested above that Barro’s estimated 7% rate of
return to schooling represents only a dynamic effect - - over and above any of the usual
micro-based static returns to schooling.
Bils and Klenow
The results of Benhabib and Spiegel have received strong support in a recent
study by Bils and Klenow (2000). Bils and Klenow use Mincer earnings equations to
impute stocks of human capital in a study that is otherwise similar to Barro’s earlier
work.9 Following Barro (1991), they regress per capita GDP growth over 1960-1990 on
schooling enrolment rates in 1960. They show, first, that a one-year increase in
schooling leads to a rise in the per capita growth rate of GDP of 0.300 percentage points.
They argue that most of this effect is due to (i) correlation of schooling with subsequent
growth in the number of workers per capita in a country, (ii) reverse causation from
growth to schooling, and (iii) omitted variables affecting both schooling and growth. The
effect of job growth is removed by looking at GDP growth per worker rather than per
capita, which reduces the impact of schooling to 0.213 percentage points. Human capital
stocks are then imputed for each country, and it is found that there is a very weak relation
between initial schooling and human capital growth. In fact, in some of the
parameterizations considered, this relationship is negative. The similarity to the results of
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) is striking.
Bils and Klenow go on to show that their direct measures of human capital growth
explain a large part of the residual GDP per capita growth that cannot be explained by
8

This leaves one wondering why human capital does not have the expected direct impact as a factor of
production. More factors are supposed to produce more output. A possible explanation is that most of the
micro-based returns to schooling represent signaling or screening, rather than socially productive
investment. Another possibility is that estimates of the change in human capital stocks are simply too
badly measured to show up as significant. (It is well known that the impact of measurement error is
increased when first differences are taken.)
9
Mincer equations are explained in the next section.
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increases in the stock of physical capital, that is TFP growth. This is consistent with the
results of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), and again suggests that human capital
externalities may be important for growth.
Heckman and Klenow
Heckman and Klenow (1997) - - "HK" - - provide a skeptical review of selected
portions of the literature on human capital externalities. Some of their points relate to
dynamic issues, and others to statics. The latter are discussed in the next section. They
stress the following points re growth:
1. If schooling and human capital are important in explaining growth, this does not
necessarily mean that human capital externalities are important. Human capital may be
contributing simply as a private input.
2. Compared with studies of international income differences, “studies of ‘dynamic
externalities’ to human-capital-intensive R&D are more numerous and the evidence from
these studies is more robust…” Readers are referred to Griliches (2001) for a survey.
Many studies have found that “controlling for its own R&D, a firm experiences faster
productivity growth the greater the R&D of ‘technologically close’ firms. And when
productivity growth is regressed on R&D, the coefficient tends to be larger the higher the
level of aggregation…” However HK are unconvinced by even this evidence,
commenting that firms may just be responding to common shocks to the productivity of
R&D or the business cycle. “Ideally, instruments could be used to deal with
simultaneity, but as in many literatures the search for valid instruments has been in vain.”
3. HK review the results of growth accounting exercises: Jorgenson (1995) for the U.S.
and other OECD countries in the postwar period up to the mid 1980’s; Young (1995) for
the Asian tigers; and Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) for 98 countries over 1960-85.
The broad conclusion is that there is room for externalities equal to about 50% of the
“object” contribution of human capital, over and above the latter. That is, TFP growth
equals about half the direct contribution of human capital. However HK are skeptical
that human capital externalities can explain much of the TFP residual. They refer to
Greenwood et al. (1997) who estimate that improvements in the quality of equipment
explain about 60% of the TFP residual in the postwar U.S.
Hendricks
Hendricks (forthcoming) criticizes the original MRW neoclassical story from a
new perspective. He starts from the observation that immigrants typically experience
large earnings gains on moving to the U.S. He uses country-specific Mincer equations
(see next section) to model their earnings in source countries, and compares these with
their actual earnings in the U.S. Immigrants' earnings rise up to 30 times on moving to
the U.S. However, Hendricks calculates, if the only differences between source countries
and the U.S. were “object” differences (principally higher physical capital per person)
their earnings should no more than double when they migrate. Thus, he concludes,
differences in technology across countries must be very large. In other words, idea gaps
must be much more important than object gaps. This conclusion once again leaves room
for human capital to affect incomes via technology - - that is through the adoption and
innovation effects.

10

McMahon
Walter McMahon has pursued a long research program on the effects of education
- - on productivity, R&D, development, and non-market variables. (See e.g., McMahon,
1992, 1999, 2001.) In McMahon (1999) he provides an ambitious study of the full
benefits of education - - market and non-market, direct and indirect, internal and external,
using a sample of 78 countries. He estimates equations for GDP per capita growth, and
for physical investment rates, separately for each of four regions - - Africa, East Asia,
Latin America, and the OECD. Data are for five-year periods from 1965 to 1990.
Specifications in the four regions differ, but the growth equations estimated are broadly
similar to those estimated by Barro. One significant difference is that, rather than using
initial schooling attainment as his education variable, McMahon uses enrolment or
education investment rates in the period 1960-65.
In addition to estimating his growth and investment equations, McMahon
estimates equations using the full sample (or sub samples that have the required data) to
explain, and study the effect of education on, a wide range of other variables. These
include population growth, fertility, income inequality, human rights, voting rights
(“democratization”), political stability, rural poverty, infant mortality, life expectancy,
deforestation, and crime. He then performs simulations to explore the full effect of (i)
raising male and female secondary education enrolment rates by 20 percentage points,
and (ii) a 2 percentage point increase in public investment in education as a fraction of
GNP. The simulations run for a period of 40 years (from 1995 to 2035), and take into
account all feedbacks from market and non-market variables onto growth.10
McMahon's study is of special interest here, not only because of its consideration
of feedbacks from non-market effects of education on growth, but because McMahon is
interested in how social and private rates of return to education compare. Arias and
McMahon (1998) estimated full (static plus purely dynamic) private rates of return to
education in the U.S. They obtained rates of 11.3 % and 13.3 % for high school and
college respectively. Taking into account all feedbacks, McMahon (1999) obtains a full
social rate of return of 14 %. For the U.K., private rates of return were estimated at 13%
and 11% for high school and college, while the social rate of return was 15 %. (See
McMahon, 1999, p. 251.) Broadly speaking, these results suggest purely dynamic market
externalities around 1 - 2 percentage points of the social return to education.11
OECD Countries
While Barro and others have found an impact of schooling attainment, or the
human capital stock, on growth in large samples of countries, when attention is focused
only on rich countries, or the OECD countries, the estimated effect is much smaller, and
sometimes insignificant. (See e.g. Barro, 2001a and 2001b, or Pritchett, 1999.) The
10

McMahon (2001) reports further simulations that use a 45-year period.
One may ask whether these comparatively small returns are consistent with Barro’s estimated 7 percent
return to schooling. We suggested earlier that Barro’s return might best be thought of as the purely
dynamic component of the full return. McMahon finds that full private rates of return are about 3
percentage points above static private returns. Thus, Barro’s 7 percent may be compared with McMahon’s
1 – 2 percent plus 3 percent. Thus, estimates of purely dynamic returns from the two studies appear to be
in the same ballpark.
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OECD, in company with e.g. Krueger and Lindahl (1999) and Temple (1999), believes
that a large part of the problem may be due to measurement error in schooling attainment.
De la Fuente and Domenech (2000), for example, have constructed "an improved data set
using available national and international sources, with an eye to ensuring coherence over
time as well as agreement with recently collected OECD data on educational attainment.
Using this data set, they find that human capital does have a substantial and positive
impact on growth in GDP or income per capita" (OECD, 2001, p. 31). It is also reported
that OECD studies indicate "the improvement in human capital has been one of the key
factors behind the growth process of the past decades in all OECD countries, but
especially so in Germany (mainly in the 1980's), Italy, Greece, the Netherlands (mainly
in the 1980's) and Spain where the increase in human capital accounted for more than
half a percentage point acceleration in growth with respect to the previous decade". For
OECD countries as a whole, we are told, "the implication is that each extra year of fulltime education … is associated with an increase in output per capita of about 6 percent".
OECD (2001) refers approvingly to the "generally favorable picture of the impact
of human capital" provided by the review of Temple (2001). The latter concludes that
"The balance of recent evidence points to productivity effects of education which are at
least as large as those identified by labor economists". The OECD is effectively claiming
two things. In claiming that education causes growth in the OECD countries they are
asserting that the dynamic returns found by Barro, McMahon and others for large sample
of countries apply also in the OECD. And by claiming that each year of education
increases GDP per capita by 6 % they are asserting that previous results showing a lack
of impact of human capital growth on income growth are wrong. The latter results could
conceivably be reconciled with e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) or Bils and Klenow
(2000) if those previous studies were severely affected by measurement error. Detailed
investigation of the reasons for the contrasting results would be worthwhile.
Note, finally, that both Gemmell (1995) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find
tertiary education is relatively more important for explaining growth in OECD countries,
and primary & secondary schooling more important in poor countries. To the extent that
tertiary education has a special role in preparing workers for technological adoption or
innovation, this seems consistent with growth effects of education in the rich countries
operating largely via “ideas” rather than “objects”.
Summary
While there has been heat as well as light in the literature reviewed, a somewhat
consistent story seems to emerge. While there is some recent contrary evidence for the
OECD, growth of human capital does not cause GDP per capita growth according to
most cross-country studies. On the other hand, a large number of studies agree that the
stock of human capital has a positive impact on growth. There is evidence that this
impact occurs via technology adoption and innovation - - with adoption most important
in poor countries and innovation most important in rich countries. Human capital thus
may have its growth effects primarily via reduction of “ideas gaps” rather than “object
gaps”. In growth accounting terms, the critical contribution of human capital may be to
increase TFP growth. McMahon’s estimates suggest that dynamic human capital
externalities form about 1 - 2 percentage points of the social rate of return to education.
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III. Static Market Externalities: Macro Evidence
Recently a number of authors have argued that it ought to be possible to apply
standard labor economics techniques to cross-country macro data in order to estimate the
external effects of schooling. This involves the estimation of Mincer equations using
cross-country aggregate data.
The classic Mincer earnings equation was derived from simple human capital
theory. (See Mincer, 1974.) It predicts the following equilibrium relationship between
years of schooling, s, and earnings, E, taking into account the influence of years of
experience, x:12
(3)

log E = b + cs + d(x)

where d(x) is some function, often taken to be quadratic in empirical work. The
coefficient c is generally interpreted as an estimate of the rate of return to schooling.
Typical values in recent studies for Canada and the U.S. are in the range 0.07 - - 0.10,
indicating an average 7 - 10% real rate of return (before-tax) on human capital
investment.13
If there are static externalities to human capital, these will not show up in microbased estimates of (3). However, in principle, such externalities should be evident in
cross-country estimates of c using aggregate data. That is because the human capital
market externalities will be included in a country’s GDP. Thus comparisons of macroand micro-based estimates of c ought to provide a measure of static market externalities.
Several papers have now applied the Mincer equation using macro data. Heckman
and Klenow (1997) - - HK - - find a rate of return of 23.0% in their cross-country Mincer
regressions. However, they find that this rate of return drops dramatically, to just 10.6%,
when they introduce a life expectancy variable - - which they regard as a proxy for
technology. Topel (1999) performs a similar exercise, but controls for age and year
effects as well as life expectancy. He finds a drop in the estimated rate of return from
22.6% to 6.2%. Bloom et al. (2001) follow a different estimation approach from HK and
Topel. They estimate a production function of the basic form (1) in first differences, but
specify h as being determined by a Mincer equation. Their point estimates of the social
rate of return to schooling, when life expectancy and a technological catch-up variable
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Mincer set out (3) as an equilibrium relationship that would have to hold in order to ensure that workers
acquiring any observed level of schooling were rewarded by a rate of return on their investment, at the
margin, equal to their (possibly shadow) cost of borrowing. However, the Mincer equation is almost
universally interpreted these days as akin to a production function. For an undeservedly neglected
discussion of the limitations of this approach see MacDonald (1981).
13
Two standard concerns about estimates of c in (3) are ability bias and measurement error. Because more
able people on average get more schooling, part of the effect of schooling merely reflects ability. This
biases the coefficient up. On the other hand, measurement error in s biases the coefficient down.
Conventional wisdom has been that the two effects are approximately offsetting. However, using a sample
of identical twins to control better for ability, Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) find that ability bias is
smaller than measurement error. Their estimates of the private rate of return to schooling are in the 12 –
16% range, rather than the usual 7 – 10% range.
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are included, is 11.6%. They conclude that their estimates “are consistent with micro
estimates of the effects of individual schooling on earnings based on the Mincer earnings
function, and suggest that there are no externalities to education.”
The HK, Topel, and Bloom et al. results appear to leave zero room for static
human capital externalities. However, it should be noted that all three studies make use
of life expectancy as an explanatory variable. The interpretation of this variable varies
between the studies. HK and Topel regard it as a proxy for technology. Bloom et al., on
the other hand, regard it as a measure of health, which they believe is an important
component of human capital along with schooling. Given that the life expectancy
variable has such important effects on the results more investigation is needed of exactly
how it exerts its influence. There are the usual potential problems of simultaneity and
unobserved variable bias. To put these in stark form, suppose that differences in life
expectancy across countries were simply determined by differences in (quantity and
quality of) education. Suppose also that life expectancy is much better measured than
education. Then when it is introduced it will rob standard schooling measures of
significance and likely bias the coefficient on schooling downwards. More research
seems to be required.
IV. Static Market Externalities: Micro Evidence
Neighborhood Effects on Schooling
Wolfe and Haveman (2001) catalogue a large number of studies that examine the
impact of parents’ (and sometimes grandparents’) education on offspring’s success in
school, and a smaller but still sizeable number of studies that examine neighborhood
effects. Since schooling has a well-established strong effect on earnings, I include these
studies here under market externalities. (Similar studies of e.g. teen pregnancy, crime
and health are discussed in the next section, which is on non-market externalities.) Most
of these studies have used U.S. panel data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) or (less frequently) the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS).
It is well established that parental education (and family background more
generally) has an important effect on children’s schooling and earnings. However, in my
view this is largely irrelevant in a discussion of human capital externalities since I believe
that families internalize most of these benefits. That is, one of the benefits people expect
from accumulating human capital is that they will be able to do more for their own
children in a variety of ways. Rational people should take this into account when
deciding how much schooling and training to obtain.
Neighborhood effects, on the other hand, may reflect genuine externalities. Wolfe
and Haveman list eight studies that examined the impact of a variety of neighborhood
characteristics reflecting human or social capital on various measures of success in
schooling. (Five of the studies use the PSID, one the NLS, and two use Census data.)
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See Bloom et al. (2001) Table 1, column 3. The coefficient on schooling (.082) must be divided by that
on labor (.708) to get the estimated social rate of return. The Table 1 results constrain TFP to be constant
across countries. Bloom et al. also present results (Table 2) allowing TFP to vary across countries, and
introducing geographical and institutional variables. The impact of schooling becomes negative in this
case.
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Six of the studies, whose dependent variable was years of schooling (2 studies) or
whether the individual graduated from high school (4 studies), found mainly significant
neighborhood effects. Variables that were significant in these studies include:
Average family income
Percent in managerial/professional jobs (2 studies)
Percent of families with income > $30,000
Percent of young adults who dropped out of high school
Percent of households in poverty
Insignificant effects were found for a number of neighborhood variables by Lillard
(1993), who studied determinants of years of college planned and attended for NLS males
graduating in 1972, and by Plotnick and Hoffman (1999) who did a logistic regression to
explain whether PSID women who graduated between 1976 and 1987 obtained any postsecondary schooling. Significant variables in these two studies were:
Occupation-specific difference between mean neighborhood and national
earnings for professionals/managers (Lillard)
Percent college-bound in high school (Lillard)
Number of library hours in high school (Lillard)
Percent of families with income > $30,000 (Plotnick and Hoffman)
Insignificant variables were:
Household earnings in school district (Lillard)
Occupation-specific difference between mean neighborhood and national
earnings for occupations other than professionals/managers (Lillard)
Percent professionals/managers in zip code (Lillard)
Percent craftsmen in zip code (Lillard)
Variance in education in zip code (Lillard)
Percent of female-headed families with kids (Plotnick and Hoffman)
Percent of families with income < $10,000 (Plotnick and Hoffman)
Neighborhood non-elderly poverty rate (Plotnick and Hoffman)
Percent of families receiving welfare (Plotnick and Hoffman)
A possible interpretation of these results is that neighborhood human and social capital is
important in determining whether people graduate from high school, but that, conditional
on high school completion, neighborhood effects are less important. In other words,
accessibility to post-secondary education in the U.S. may be less of a problem than
unequal opportunity at the secondary level. It may be that low quality schools in poor
neighborhoods are a trap that saps human capital accumulation in the U.S., but high
school graduation frees individuals from this trap and allows them access to more equal
opportunity. Whether such conclusions could carry over to Canada, to any degree, is an
interesting question. I am not aware of any evidence on this.
Neighborhood Effects on Earnings
Another important strand in the micro study of human capital externalities
includes contributions that look at neighborhood effects on earnings. Controlling for own
education and experience, Rauch (1993) found that individuals' earnings rose by 3.1% in
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response to an additional year of average education in an SMSA (Standard Metropolitan
Statistical Area). Similar effects were found by Moretti (1999). However, Rudd (1996)
finds that Rauch's results become insignificant when he constructs a 14 year panel of
March CPS data and introduces state fixed effects. Heckman, Layne-Ferrar and Todd
(1996), also using Census region data, fail to find any systematic evidence of human
capital spillovers.
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) have recently examined human capital earnings
externalities in the U.S. using an interesting new approach. First they reproduce the
apparent evidence in favor of externalities by estimating a Mincer equation for individual
earnings with average schooling in the individual's state, s*, included as follows:
(4)

log E = b + cs + c*s* + d(x) + u

where u is an error term. When a simple OLS regression of this form is run both c and c*
are approximately equal to 0.07. If this result could be trusted it would say that the
internal and external benefits of human capital are equally significant.
Estimating (4) by OLS may not be safe because of the strong possibility of
correlation between u and s*. States’ unobserved attributes might well affect earnings
and average education in the same direction. It therefore becomes advisable to apply
instrumental variable (IV) methods.
In recent years economists have taken advantage of a simple natural experiment to
attempt to get better estimates of c in (3). Standard practice in North America is to enroll
in Grade 1 each September all children who will turn 6 years old by the end of the year.
This means that students born later in the year must spend a longer time span in school
before they reach minimum school-leaving age (MSLA). Census data in the U.S. for
some years record individuals’ quarters of birth, QOB. Since the MSLA is binding for
some students, QOB is correlated with s. However, it is unlikely to be correlated with u
since earnings shocks for adults should not be correlated with their season of birth. Thus
QOB should make a good instrument for s.
Acemoglu and Angrist apply a conceptually similar technique to obtain
instruments for s* in (4). U.S. states differ in their minimum school leaving ages
(“compulsory attendance” - - CA) and also in their minimum working ages (“child labor”
- - CL). For each individual in their sample of U.S. males aged 40 –49 Acemoglu and
Angrist form variables CA and CL based on the legislation in force in the state of the
individual’s birth, when that individual was aged 14.15 CA and CL are correlated with s*,
but are arguably independent of earnings shocks u in (3) since they relate to legislation in
force about 30 years before the observation of earnings. They thus should make good
instruments for s*.
With their IV approach, Acemoglu and Angrist obtain estimates of c*
approximately equal to, and insignificantly different from, zero. Thus, their point
estimates suggest human capital externalities in the U.S., at least for middle-aged males
15

Males are used because females differ much more in years of labor force experience, and the latter are
unobserved in the data. The age group 40-49 is chosen because workers in this group are on the flattest
portion of the age-earnings profile.
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are approximately zero. They issue several caveats, however, and others have also
pointed out the following:
1. The estimates of c* are not very precise. The 95% confidence interval includes a 6%
return to externalities. (On the other hand, the results are robust to a range of alternative
specifications in the estimation.)
2. While externalities may not be important for middle-aged males they might be
important for other groups, for example minority youth, on whom a lot of policy attention
focuses.
3. Externalities may not be very strong at the state level, but they could be stronger e.g. at
the city level.
V. Non-market Externalities
It is important to recognize the distinction between non-market effects, and nonmarket externalities of human capital. It is well established, for example, that greater
schooling is associated with better health, greater longevity, and reduced probability of
teenage pregnancy both in micro data and in cross-country comparisons. But such nonmarket effects could, conceivably, be mostly internalized. This may be particularly true
in advanced countries like Canada where there is a high standard of public health, a
relatively clean environment, generally safe handling & packaging of food, nearuniversal access to refrigeration and so on. Individual knowledge of hygiene, safe foodhandling etc. may be less crucial than at an earlier stage of development.
There have been a large number of studies on the non-market effects of education.
(See e.g. Behrman and Stacey, 1997; McMahon, 1999; and the Wolfe and Haveman,
2001 survey.) While these studies may be subject to omitted variable and simultaneity
biases, and experience the typical difficulties in finding adequate instruments, many
believe they provide evidence of strong effects. Wolfe and Haveman conclude that the
non-market benefits of education are likely similar quantitatively to the market benefits.
This has two possible alternative implications:
1. Non-market effects are mostly internal: If non-market effects are mostly internal
we face a puzzle. The private returns to schooling average about 7 - 10% in
Canada and the U.S (before-tax). If non-market returns are of a similar magnitude,
and are internalized by individuals, even allowing for taxes, private returns would
have to average above 10% - - and perhaps as high as 15 – 20%. This presents a
puzzle. We are used to believing that average returns on human capital may exceed
average private returns on other assets, due either to the riskiness of human capital
investment or borrowing constraints. However, in countries with advanced
financial systems, relatively generous student loans, and high rates of participation
in post-secondary education, it seems hard to believe that private returns to
education could so greatly exceed the returns on other forms of investment. But, if
this were the right interpretation, there would be reason to review and perhaps
enhance our student loan plans.
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2. Non-market effects are mostly external: If this is the case, then there is a good
case for high rates of subsidy. Education is, of course, already highly subsidized,
so that it is not clear there is a case for increased subsidies. However, if nonmarket effects are as sizeable as suggested by Wolfe and Haveman then it seems
quite possible that a case for increased subsidies could be constructed.
So, either way, sizeable non-market effects of education can provide a rationale for
strong public intervention - - although in different forms depending on whether nonmarket effects are mostly internalized.
Health and Longevity
Here are some representative results on the impact of education on health and
longevity:
1. Feldman et al. (1989) studied the relative risk of death from heart disease in the
U.S. for those with only 8 – 11 years of schooling vs. those with 12 or more
years. He found that the risk was 85% greater for males aged 45-64, 25%
greater for males aged 65-74, and 37% greater for females aged 65-74.
2. In a widely-respected study for the U.S. Kenkel (1991) found that an additional
year of schooling led to an average of 1.6 fewer cigarettes smoked per day for
men and 1.1 fewer for women in 1985. On average, an additional year of
schooling led to 17 minutes more exercise per week.
3. There is “substantial evidence that child health is positively related to parents’
education”. (Wolfe and Haveman, 2001, Table 2, citing e.g. King and Hill,
1993; Glewwe, 1999; and Lam and Duryea, 1999.)
4. There is “considerable evidence that own schooling positively affects one’s
health status”. (Wolfe and Haveman, 2001, Table 2 citing e.g. Grossman and
Joyce, 1989; Kenkel, 1991; and Strauss et al. 1993.) It also increases life
expectancy (Feldman et al., 1989; King and Hill, 1993) and lowers prevalence
of severe mental illness (Robins et al., 1984).
5. McMahon (1999) estimates the determinants of a number of non-market
variables for a large cross-section of countries. He then simulates alternatively
the effects of a 2 percentage-point increase in the fraction of GNP spent on
education and a 20 percentage-point increase in secondary enrolment over a
40-year period beginning in 1995. He compares simulated results of these
policy changes in 2035 with those of a simulation that continues current
policies. The increased expenditure simulation leads in the U.S. to a drop in
infant mortality of about 0.3% (from 10.99 to 10.96 deaths per 1,000 births)
and an increase in life expectancy from about 76 to 77 years (McMahon, 1999,
Figure 12.13). Corresponding effects in the U.K. are a 5% drop in infant
mortality (from 8.90 to 8.84 per 1,000) and a rise in life expectancy from about
76 to 77.5 years. Impacts of the simulated enrolment increase in the two
countries are about two thirds as large as those of the spending increase.

18

6. From a public finance perspective, it is useful to distinguish between the
impacts of education on morbidity and mortality. Reductions in morbidity
likely in general lead to reduced public health care expenses - - an external
benefit. On the other hand, increased longevity leads to higher public pension
payments and perhaps also increased health spending. In recent years there has
been a substantial decline in adult smoking. In attempting to assess the
implications, Shoven et al. (1987) estimated that if no one born in 1920 in the
U.S. had smoked, the annual cost of current social security benefit payouts
would have been $14.5 billion higher due to increased longevity. In contrast,
the reduced morbidity due to decreased smoking has been estimated to have
relatively small effects on health spending (compared e.g. to tobacco taxes)
since, regrettably, smoking related deaths on average come comparatively
quickly after the onset of illness.
It is useful to look at one of the most widely cited papers in the education and health
literature more closely. Kenkel (1991) used a 1985 U.S. dataset that included variables
on both health behavior - - smoking, drinking, and exercise - - and knowledge of the
effects of those forms of behavior. By 1991 it was clear that there was a strong empirical
relationship between education and health. Kenkel wanted to find out more about how
precisely the two were linked. He therefore turned the focus from explaining health
outcomes to studying the determinants of health behavior. One benefit is that some
unobserved or unobservable individual differences that affect both schooling and health
directly - - such as chronic health conditions that interfere with schooling attainment as
well as later health - - should have less effect on the observed relationship between
schooling and health behavior.
It turns out that education is not only associated with greater health, it is also
associated with better health behavior.16 Kenkel points out there are at least four reasons
for the latter association: (i) education may improve health knowledge resulting in
improved health behavior (greater allocative efficiency in choice of health inputs), (ii)
unobservable differences between individuals that affect both schooling and behavior
(e.g. time preference rates), (iii) omitted variable bias, (iv) higher schooling may lead to
greater efficiency in health production, for given health inputs. He also mentions, in
passing, that greater education could change preferences (e.g. by reducing time
preference rates), leading to altered health behavior.
Kenkel finds that controlling for health knowledge only reduces the coefficient on
schooling in his estimated tobit equations by 5 – 20%. Thus, the influence of schooling
does not appear to operate mainly through its impact on health knowledge. He attempts
to control the most important sources of omitted variable bias, for example by including a
family income variable. But it is impossible to control for unobserved variables, or to
identify impacts on preferences or efficiency in health production. Thus, Kenkel
concludes that exactly why schooling is so strongly associated with health behavior is
unclear. It is hard to escape the feeling that it will remain so.
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Interestingly, Kenkel found that, controlling for health knowledge and family income, higher schooling
led to more total consumption of alcoholic drinks per week. On the other hand, it also was associated with
a lower incidence of heavy drinking, which is the prime health risk from alcohol.
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Kenkel’s lack of conclusion regarding the link between education and health
behavior is instructive, since it seems likely that unobservable individual differences,
omitted variables and so on may also account for part of the observed relations between
education and fertility, longevity, crime, civic participation and so on. The belief that
interventions to raise schooling will have major beneficial social impacts may ultimately
find its firmest basis in theory and judgement, rather than in empirical evidence.
Two other points that arise in connection with Kenkel’s work are worth
emphasizing:
1. Kenkel found that for cigarettes there was an important interaction between health
knowledge and schooling. Those with higher schooling reduced their smoking more for a
given increase in health knowledge. (Parallel results were not found for drinking and
exercise.) He also points out that earlier studies found that, prior to the Surgeon
General’s report in the early 1960's (which had a strong impact on knowledge of the
health effects of smoking), higher schooling was not related to lower smoking. Thus, at
least for smoking, it appears that schooling and health knowledge have reinforcing
effects.
2. Two of the three behaviors Kenkel studies are especially interesting since the
behaviors themselves, rather than own health outcomes, may cause externalities. There
has been much recent emphasis on the dangers of second-hand smoke. And the dangers
of drinking heavily and driving have been obvious for a long time. Kenkel refers to
earlier studies that found that smoking externalities were fully, or more than fully,
internalized by smokers in the U.S. as a result of tobacco taxes (Keeler et al., 1989; and
Manning et al., 1989). However, Kenkel also mentions that the evidence as of 1991 for
the U.S. was that taxes on alcohol were not sufficient to internalize externalities from
drinking.
Fertility
Many studies in developed countries indicate that high school completion and
increased years of schooling reduce the probability that teenaged females will give birth.
More generally, Wheeler (1984), McMahon (1999) and others find that there is a strong
negative effect of education on fertility in cross-national data. McMahon estimates, for
example, that when strong family planning programs are in place an increase in the total
female enrolment rate (primary plus secondary) from 50% to 100% reduces the fertility
rate on average by 1.3 children per woman. When average family planning is in place the
reduction is by 0.4 children.
In his 40 year simulations of the effects of raising education expenditures by 2
percentage-points as a fraction of GNP or raising secondary enrolment by 20 percentagepoints, McMahon (1999) finds that the increased expenditures would reduce fertility by
about 10% in 2035 in the U.S. In the U.K. the effect is about 15%. The impact of the
enrolment policy is about half as great as that of the expenditure policy in the U.K., and
about two thirds as great in the U.S.
The negative impact of education on fertility raises interesting issues. In an LDC
with high population density and a high growth rate of population it is possible that
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reduced fertility would be seen as having positive external effects. On the other hand in
advanced countries where the birth rate is already significantly below the replacement
level, as in Canada, society may be seen as being a net gainer from additional births.
Intergenerational accounting exercises in Canada, the U.S. and other countries, for
example, indicate that the expected contribution of the average young person to the
public purse over their lifetime is substantially positive. Also, if one believes that human
capital in general has positive externalities, additional children will confer substantial
externalities on society over and above their net contribution to the public purse. This
suggests that the fertility-reducing impact of schooling should likely be regarded as an
external cost, rather than an external benefit.
Crime
Witte (1997) and McMahon (1999) review the literature on the relationship
between education and crime. Briefly, it is found that the impact of education, holding
other factors constant, on the propensity of those who have completed schooling to
commit crime is weak. However, whether young men are productively occupied - - i.e.
enrolled in school or employed - - has a strong impact on their likelihood of committing
an offence. In cross-national data McMahon finds that both enrolment rates and
unemployment rates have strong and significant effects (of opposite signs). In his
simulations, a 20 percentage-point enrolment increase would reduce the homicide rate in
the U.S. by about 15%. The same policy in the U.K. would reduce property crime by a
small amount (less than 1%).
The benefit of keeping teenage males occupied and under supervision has recently
been highlighted by the wave of arson in Australia over the Christmas (i.e. summer)
holidays. Other striking illustrations of the principle can be seen if we look back in
history. The high crime rates of the early Victorian period in the U.K., for example, may
have had much to do with the broad base of the population pyramid and lack of public
schooling. Conversely, the large increase in crime (particularly property crime) in the
U.K. since the 1970's may be associated with the increase in youth unemployment rates
since that time. (Note that youth unemployment rates may be less sensitive to
employment declines in Canada due to our high enrolment rates in post-secondary
education.)
Finally, a recent influential study has been done for the U.S. by Lochner (1999).
Lochner estimates the social benefits of high school graduation through reductions in
crime, taking into account the costs of incarceration and the costs to victims as reported
by survey respondents. The extra social benefits amount to almost 20% of the private
return. He even considers this to be a conservative estimate, since a number of crimes are
not included. Also omitted are the effects on crime beyond the age of 22, reductions in
the number of crimes by those still committing crimes, criminal justice and law
enforcement costs, and finally, the overall benefits from feeling safe.
Civic Participation and Political Effects
The role of education in preparing individuals for productive participation in civic
life, especially in a democracy, has often been advertised as one of the most important
potential externalities of schooling. Recently there have been many attempts to measure
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the impact of schooling on civic and community participation and the quality of political
institutions, using both individual and cross-country data.
There is some evidence that individuals with greater education are more likely,
e.g., to vote in elections, although there is some dispute over whether the determining
factor is the absolute or relative level of education. (Wolfe and Haveman, 2001,
reference Gintis, 1971, and Campbell et al., 1976.) Higher schooling is also associated
with greater charitable giving and more volunteerism (Dye, 1980; Hodgkinson and
Weitzman, 1988; Freeman, 1997).
In international data it is found that higher education has a positive effect on
democratization and political stability. McMahon (1999, 2001) finds significant effects
of secondary education rates on indexes of democratization, human rights, and political
stability. (See also Barro, 1999, for similar results.) These effects are found after
controlling for both per capita income, and military expenditures as a fraction of public
spending. Strongest effects are found for secondary enrolment rates lagged from 15 to 20
years. McMahon also estimates the impacts of democratization, human rights and
political stability on growth, so he is able to estimate the feedback effects of education on
growth via these avenues. He finds a strong effect.
Tax and Transfer Effects
Several studies find that the more educated are less likely to rely on public
transfers, even when eligible for benefits. (Wolfe and Haveman, 2001, cite Kiefer, 1985;
Antel, 1988; and An et al. 1993.) This is no doubt an important effect. But probably
more important, quantitatively, is the impact on tax receipts. In Canada today the modal
marginal tax rate for university graduates is well in excess of 50% - - taking into account
sales and excise taxes as well as income tax. This means that every additional $1,000 in
earnings generated by university education leads to more than an additional $500 in
taxes.
Recently, Collins and Davies (2001) have estimated the wedge between before
and after-tax rates of return to first-degree university education in Canada and the U.S.
The 1998 SCF was used for Canada, and the 1998 CPS was used for the U.S. The
median reduction in the rate of return in Canada due to taxes, averaging across the sexes,
was 1.9 percentage points. In the U.S. the corresponding reduction was 1.1 percentage
points. At higher incomes the effects were larger - - 2.8 percentage points for 90th
percentile Canadian males, for example, and 1.9 percentage points for corresponding U.S.
males. (For comparison, median pre-tax returns averaged across the sexes were 12.5% in
Canada and 13.0% in the U.S.)
Environment
There is some evidence that greater education leads to beneficial environmental
effects. MacMahon (1999) finds, e.g., in his cross-country study that rates of
deforestation are lower in countries with higher schooling. (The effects of higher income
are controlled for.) Smith (1997) finds that more educated people in the U.S. are both
better informed about environmental hazards, and more likely to take effective action to
avoid or reduce such hazards.
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An important trend in education in Canada and other advanced nations for at least
the last two decades has been instruction in environmental awareness. It would in fact be
a disappointing comment on the effectiveness of education in modifying behavior if we
found that schooling did not make people more environmentally responsible. There is
room for research, for example on whether more educated households emit less
greenhouse gases, holding income and other characteristics constant. One could
investigate, e.g., whether, income constant, people with more education drive fewer
miles, are less likely to own SUV’s etc.
Consideration of environmental externalities of education raises an interesting
point about the role of education that is emphasized by Arrow (1997). Historically,
indoctrination, that is the formation or modification of preferences and behavior, was
seen as a legitimate and important goal of education. Today, our more liberal society
shuns explicit recognition of this goal, but in fact expects its schools to devote a
significant effort to training students to adopt “appropriate behavior”. Thus there is
emphasis in our schools on anti-racism, anti-sexism, and respect for diversity as well as
environmental awareness. It may be that it is in these areas that the public expects to get
some of the largest externalities from primary and secondary schooling.
Inequality
Discussions of the social or indirect effects of education often touch on the impact
of education on inequality. Indirect effects of education on incomes do generally
represent externalities. But is the impact of education on income inequality an
externality? The short answer is that it can be considered an externality if people care
about inequality in the sense that they would be willing to bear some cost to reduce it.
This parallels the sense in which some environmental effects represent externalities.
Results on the impact of education on inequality are mixed. McMahon (1999)
finds that the level of primary schooling in a country has an insignificant effect on
income inequality. On the other hand, higher secondary enrolment rates reduce
inequality. These results are for a broad cross-section of countries at different stages of
development. Recent studies of OECD countries, and especially the U.S., indicate that
increases in schooling that have taken the form of higher post-secondary graduation may
have been one of the forces that helped to increase wage and income inequality in recent
decades. (See e.g. Acemoglu, 1998, and the discussion in OECD, 2001.)
A full theoretical discussion of the impact of education on inequality would take a
whole volume. However, some interesting insights can be pointed out quickly. A good
starting point is the Mincerian model embodied in (3), which summarizes the equilibrium
wage differentials that would hold for different levels of schooling in a society with a
perfect capital market (and therefore a constant rate of return to investments in
education). The Mincer equation indicates that, in long-run equilibrium, the proportional
wage differentials for different schooling levels are constant. Income inequality is
therefore only affected by changes in the number of workers at different levels of
schooling, s.
The Mincer equation indicates that for workers of the same level of experience
the variance of log earnings, V(log E) should be a weighted sum of the variances of
schooling, V(s), and the error term. If all workers gain a year of schooling, neither V(s)
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nor V(log E) will change. Since V(log E) is a good measure of inequality in earnings, this
means that inequality is unaffected.17 On the other hand, it is easy to see that if those
with higher s got a larger increase in schooling, inequality would rise. And, inequality
would fall if the lower educated got a bigger increase in s. The latter point has some
significance in North America, in view of the fact that there are concentrations of
illiterate and very low skilled workers in both Canada and the U.S., despite the overall
high level of schooling. (See e.g. OECD, 2001, p. 26, and Crompton, 1996.) Working to
reduce the size of these poorly educated groups seems very likely to pay off in reduced
inequality.
Moving beyond the Mincer model, one must recognize that changes in the relative
supply of workers with different levels of s will affect earnings differentials in the shortrun and in the long run as well if we do not have perfect capital markets. Consider the
following simple model set out in Davies and Wooton (1992). Assume a small open
economy (i.e. a country that is a price taker for tradable goods) that produces two
tradable goods, and suppose that there are three factors of production: physical capital,
skilled labor, and unskilled labor, K, S, and U respectively. Depending on technology
and factor endowments any pair of these factors may be “friends” or “enemies”. If K
and S, for example, are friends a rise in the number of S workers will increase the rental
rate for K (and reduce wages of S of course). If K and S are enemies, then an increase in
S numbers will reduce returns for both S and K. In the model described, each factor must
have at least one friend, and friendship or enmity is mutual.
As discussed in Davies and Wooton (1992), in the model described there are two
"extreme" factors and one "middle" factor, where an extreme factor is one used most
intensively in either the import-competing or export industry. The extreme factors are
mutual enemies, while both are friends of the middle factor. Davies and Wooton report
that U.S. data indicate exports and imports are intensive in S and U respectively. This
would suggest that in the U.S. case an increase in the number of skilled workers should
reduce the wages of the unskilled and increase returns to capital. These indirect effects
would tend to raise income inequality, which may perhaps help to explain the rising trend
of inequality in the U.S. in recent years. Davies and Wooton suggest that, unlike the
U.S., Canada's exports (which are relatively heavy in commodities) may be K intensive
and its imports (skewed towards manufactured goods) S intensive. This would make S a
friend of U and an enemy of K. The result is that the indirect effects of a rise in the
number of skilled workers should tend to reduce inequality, by raising the wages of
unskilled workers and reducing returns to capital. This could perhaps help to explain
why the large increase in the relative number of university graduates in Canada has
produced a much smaller increase in wage and income inequality than in the U.S.
Now, let us consider dynamic effects that are the impact of changes in investment
and resulting capital stocks induced by an increasing relative supply of skilled workers.
According to Davies and Wooton, a rise in S numbers in the U.S. should induce an
increase in the K stock (since K returns go up). The increase in the K stock will tend to
raise S wages, offsetting to some extent their initial fall due to the expansion of S
numbers. Effects on inequality from this feedback are uncertain, however, since U wages
17

The variance of logarithms is often used in studies of wage inequality for reasons of analytical and
computational convenience. However, its use also makes theoretical sense since the distribution of labor
earnings is approximately lognormal. In the lognormal case, V(log E) describes the level of inequality
unambiguously.
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will also be bid up. In the Canadian case, with S and K being enemies, the induced
increase in the K stock will not occur, and so dynamic effects should perhaps be less
important.18
Acemoglu (1998) has pointed out that an increase in the number of highly
educated workers may affect not only the growth of other factors of production over time,
but the direction of technological change. A rise in the number of college-educated
workers will, in the short-run, bid down their relative wages. This will give innovators an
incentive to develop technologies that make greater use of more highly skilled workers.
This will increase the relative demand for the college educated, causing a rebound in their
relative earnings that may take the college wage premium to a higher level than it
enjoyed in the very beginning. Hence inequality may initially decline in response to a
rise in postsecondary participation, but then increase in the long run.
Acemoglu’s story seems to fit the U.S., the U.K. and to an extent other countries
like Canada, in recent decades. There was indeed a large increase in the number of
college-educated workers in the U.S. in the 1960s and 70s. And college wage premia did
in fact decline - - to the extent that there was concern about the “overeducated
American”. But then there was a revolution in information technology that led to the
rise of the new economy, and at the same time a rebound in the college wage premium.
It is thus plausible that the rising access to postsecondary education in the U.S. in the
postwar period ultimately caused increasing inequality - - not only in the U.S. but
elsewhere as the skill-biased technical change spread around the globe.19
While effects of education on inequality may be interesting, it must be concluded
that their direction is ambiguous. This is perhaps fortunate for the analyst of
externalities, since the task of putting a value on the inequality effects of education would
be formidable.
Size of Effects
Haveman and Wolfe (1984) tackled the problem of estimating the size of nonmarket effects in dollar terms. They pointed out that if different inputs are being used,
say, to increase health, the inputs ought to be used up to the point where the ratio of their
marginal products equaled that of their prices. Suppose that both schooling, s, and some
other input, x, (e.g. personal health expenditures) have marginal products, MPs and MPx
in the production of health. The price of x, px, is observed, but not that of schooling.
Note that the unobserved "price of schooling", ps, is a shadow price. It should correspond
with marginal willingness to pay for schooling, which by this reasoning can be found
from:

18

The predicted lower rate of investment in Canada than the U.S. is strikingly consistent with the observed
lower rate of business investment in Canada over the 1990’s. While this is certainly a plus for the Davies
and Wooton analysis, it must be kept in mind that their model is highly stylized and may have nothing to do
with the observed trends at all. Nevertheless, we have some interesting hypotheses here, which ought to be
tested in more formal work.
19
Acemoglu (1999) points out some of the effects for LDC’s that import the new technology but use less
skilled workers in conjunction with it than do the advanced countries. The result is to exaggerate the TFP
gap between rich and poor countries. In the Canadian case, we have observed a less rapid increase in
inequality since the 1970’s than in the U.S., which might be explained by our greater relative increase in
the supply of college graduates and some lag in adopting the technical changes emanating from the U.S.
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(5)

ps = (MPs/MPx)px

Wolfe and Haveman (2001) provide a table with a few such estimated shadow prices.
They calculate that the non-market value of an extra year of school includes:
- increased consumption efficiency worth $290,
- better health worth $8,950 in asset value,
- a $170 per annum reduction in policing activity, and
- from $30 - $50 in increased volunteering.
Using a 10% real rate of return for all assets and human capital, in a community where
mean family income was about $40,000 per year (approximately correct for the U.S. at
the time when the various studies used were performed), an additional year of schooling
for all earners in a family would raise private income by about $4,000. The four nonmarket effects calculated by Wolfe and Haveman add up to about $1,400. Lochner's
crime effect would be worth a further $800. Impacts on fertility, civic participation, and
other factors like improved efficiency in labor market search have not been included.
Thus, it is not hard to see how Wolfe and Haveman reached their conclusion that the
value of non-market effects was of about the same size as that of market effects.
It is important, of course, to take account of the fact that not all of the non-market
effects included by Wolfe and Haveman are externalities. Reductions in crime and
increased volunteering certainly fall in this category, but probably the bulk of health
benefits accrue to the individual. McMahon (1999) argues that about three quarters of
the static non-market effects of schooling represent externalities. If one allowed for say
half of those measured effects being due to unobserved or unobservable variables, static
non-market externalities would be three eighths of the private rate of return to schooling.
These externalities would thus add about 3 - 4 percentage points to the social rate of
return to education.
VI. Conclusion
I will not attempt to summarize this survey. What is most important is to try to
identify some "bottom line". Suppose we take the private before-tax rate of return to
education to average 10% in a country like Canada. The Collins and Davies results
suggest this corresponds to an average after-tax rate of return of about 8%. How much
can the various forms of externality that we have investigated plausibly add to this 8%?
Here are my best guesses, which of course have a substantial margin of error:
1. Dynamic externalities of education: 1 - 2 % points. The conclusion in section II was
that the dynamic effects of education appear to operate mostly via TFP growth. It is
difficult to know what fraction of this effect represents externalities, but McMahon
(1999) does provide explicit estimates (which give the range indicated here) and they
are not inconsistent with other evidence from the literature.
2. Static market externalities: 0 % points. A growing number of recent studies, in both
the macro and micro approaches, find no evidence of static earnings externalities.
3. Static non-market externalities: 3 - 4 % points. This conclusion rests on the Wolfe
and Haveman assessment, with deductions for non-market effects that are not
externalities and for bias due to unobserved or unobservable variables, as discussed in
the preceding section.
4. Tax effects: 2 % points. Based on Collins and Davies.
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Adding up these guesses, it is possible that education externalities could amount to
something like 6 - 8 % points. If so, they would be quantitatively of similar importance
to private returns. Nonetheless, this estimate of the size of human capital externalities
clearly has a large "standard error". Hence it is still the case that the empirical basis for
the belief in large human capital externalities remains relatively weak. In the end, the
strongest justification for belief in the social value of education may lie in judgement,
theory, and casual empiricism, rather than in estimation.
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